Schedule Selection by Agents: from Price Plans to Tax Tables by Erzo F.P. Luttmer & Richard J. Zeckhauser
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
SCHEDULE SELECTION BY AGENTS:









We would like to thank Chris Avery, Jerry Green, Michael Grubb, Daniel Hojman, Nolan Miller, Eugenio
Miravete and seminar participants at Cornell, Harvard, and Michigan for helpful conversations and
insightful comments.  Erzo Luttmer gratefully acknowledges funding from the National Institute on
Aging through Grant Number T32-AG00186 to the National Bureau of Economic Research.  All errors
are our own. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2008 by Erzo F.P. Luttmer and Richard J. Zeckhauser. All rights reserved. Short sections of text,
not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.Schedule Selection by Agents: from Price Plans to Tax Tables
Erzo F.P. Luttmer and Richard J. Zeckhauser




Requiring agents with private information to select from a menu of incentive schedules can yield efficiency
gains.  It will do so if, and only if, agents will receive further private information after selecting the
incentive schedule but before taking the action that determines where on the incentive schedule they
end up.  We argue that this information structure is relevant in many applications. We develop the
theory underlying optimal menus of non-linear schedules and prove that there exists a menu of schedules
that offers a strict first-order interim Pareto improvement over the optimal single non-linear schedule.
We quantify the gains from schedule selection in two settings.  The first is a stylized example of a
monopolistic utility company increasing profits by offering a menu of price plans.  The second is a
simulation based on U.S. earnings data, which shows that moving to a tax system that allows individuals
to choose their tax schedule increases social welfare by the same amount as would occur from a 4.0
percent windfall gain in the government budget (or about $600 per filer per year).  The resulting reduction
in distortions accounts for about two thirds of the increase in social welfare while the remainder comes
from an increase in redistribution.
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1.  Introduction 
 
Agents select schedules in many contexts.  Individuals choosing a phone plan choose among a 
number of alternative schedules, each typically consisting of a subscription fee, a low price per 
minute for a certain number of minutes with a high price per minute thereafter.  Similarly, 
consumers may select among price plans offered by a utility company.  Employers may offer 
their sales force various compensation schedules – some with a relatively low base compensation 
and high commissions, and others with a relatively high base compensation and low 
commissions.  Governments also offer a menu of incentive schedules in many contexts.  When 
closely held firms decide whether to function as Schedule C or Schedule S corporations, they are 
essentially choosing between schedules.  So too are spouses in the U.K., who for tax purposes 
must choose ex-ante how to allocate joint capital income between them.  Individuals deciding 
how much to contribute to their medical flexible spending account in effect decide on the 
schedule of marginal costs they will face for medical spending in the coming year.  American 
senior citizens face a schedule selection challenge when deciding whether to participate in the 
Medicare drug program and, if so, which plan to choose.  More generally, anyone deciding 
whether or not to enroll in some money-saving plan with an up-front fee is choosing from a two-
item menu of schedules.   
This paper determines when offering a menu of schedules can generate an efficiency 
improvement over the optimal non-linear incentive schedule.  The essential setup is an expanded 
screening model.  As with the standard screening model, an agent’s type is private information, 
and agents of different types have preferences that differ in the space of the incentive schedule.  
Thus, in the cell phone example, an agent with a higher type would value additional cell phone 
minutes more highly for each usage level.  The model expands the standard screening model 
because agents secure private information at two stages, not merely one.  Thus, each agent 
possesses private information about her future type before she selects one of the schedules the 
principal offers.  Then after choosing her schedule, she receives additional private information 
that precisely defines her type.  Given her type, she picks a single point on her previously 
selected incentive schedule.  We will refer to the initial private information, i.e., the information 
at the point of schedule selection, as the agent’s signal, and the subsequent private information as 
the agent’s type.  For example, the agent might know that she generally will be a heavy cell 
phone user (her signal), but before she chooses her phone plan, she is unlikely to know whether   3 
some lengthy calls will become desirable that month (her type).  When she must choose among 
the menu of schedules, the agent will select the one that maximizes her expected utility, given 
her subjective distribution of her future types.  We shall assume rational expectations, i.e., that 
these subjective distributions are accurate.  Note, an agent’s signal only affects the probability 
distribution of the agent’s type and is therefore no longer pay-off relevant once she learns her 
type.   
The principal offers a menu of non-linear schedules to maximize his objective function.  
The maximand would be social welfare were the principal a welfare-maximizing government 
offering a menu of tax schedules.  The maximand would be profits were the principal a cell 
phone company.  The timing of this setup is summarized in Figure 1.  Because an agent learns 
her type with certainty only after she has chosen her incentive schedule, some agents will regret 
their choice of incentive schedule once they learn their type. 
Providing the principal with additional instruments cannot hurt the principal (there are no 
commitment problems).  Thus, it is immediate that offering a menu of non-linear schedules 
yields a weak gain to the principal over the constrained optimal outcome given a single non-
linear schedule.  The more surprising result is that, in a wide range of cases, this gain is strict and 
first order.
1  Part of this gain is due to the fact that the menu of schedules allows resources to be 
redistributed to the principal’s advantage.  If the principal were a profit-maximizing company, 
this redistribution would take the form of the principal extracting more rents from the agents.  If 
                                                 
1 The qualifier “a wide range of cases” is spelled out in detail in Proposition 2.  In particular, our proof assumes 
separable utility and a standard solution to the optimal single incentive schedule (no corner solution, no bundling, 
binding incentive constraints).  With this setup, an interim-by-type, first-order efficiency gain is achieved except in 
the following two cases: (i) the degenerate case where the signal is either perfectly informative or perfectly 
uninformative and (ii) one combination of parameters that has Lebesgue measure zero.  We also prove that when 
there are two or fewer types, offering a menu of schedules can never produce a strict welfare gain.  Of course, this 
does not rule out cases with two or fewer agents, because a single agent could have many potential types. 
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the principal were a government, part of the social welfare increase would come from more 
redistribution from richer individuals to poorer ones. 
However, even if one has no interest in any gains stemming from a redistribution of 
resources, the schedule-selection approach still offers advantages.  We prove that it generically 
produces a first-order interim Pareto efficiency gain.  The Pareto gain is interim in the sense that 
average utility of each type increases (where the average is taken with respect to the signal 
received).  The interim Pareto efficiency gain implies an ex-ante efficiency gain.  Behind the veil 
of ignorance, i.e., before learning one’s signal or type, all agents would prefer the menu of 
schedules to the optimal single non-linear schedule. 
If functional form restrictions are imposed on a price schedule, allowing agents to select 
from a menu of price schedules can yield welfare gains simply because the menu effectively 
relaxes the functional form restrictions.  For example, as Faulhaber and Panzar (1977) 
acknowledge, the menu of two-part tariffs in their model is equivalent to a single non-linear 
pricing schedule.  Similarly, the menu of tax schedules in Alesina and Weil (1992) is effectively 
a single non-linear schedule.  This equivalence between a menu of schedules and a single non-
linear schedule breaks down when agents receive further private information about their type 
after selecting a schedule from the menu.  Such an information structure is employed in Baron 
and Besanko (1984), Clay et al. (1992), Miravete (1996, 2002, 2005), Courty and Li (2000), and 
Grubb (2007).  These papers differ in the types of screening problems modeled, restrictions 
imposed on the schedules, and restrictions imposed on type and signal distributions.  Clay et al. 
(1992) compare a menu of two-part tariffs to a single three-part (or tapered) tariff rather than 
allowing arbitrary functional forms for the tariffs.  Miravete (1996, 2002) also limits the menu of 
schedules to a menu of two-part tariffs.  The remaining papers impose no functional form 
restrictions on the schedules.  Their contributions, nicely synthesized in Rochet and Stole (2003), 
lie in characterizing the design of optimal menus of non-linear schedules.   
The theoretical contribution of this paper consists of two new results concerning the 
welfare properties of a menu of schedules.  First, we prove that the gain to the principal of 
offering a menu of schedules generically is strict and first-order.  Second, we show that 
generically there exists a menu of schedules that yields an interim-by-type efficiency gain over 
the optimal single non-linear schedule.   5 
The empirical contribution of this paper is to characterize the magnitudes of the gains to 
the principal and to decompose this gain into a component due to a reallocation of resources to 
the principal’s advantage and a component due to an increase in efficiency.  We provide two 
simulations.  One highly-stylized simulation shows how a monopolistic utility company can 
increase its profits by offering a menu of rate schedules.  We demonstrate to what extent this 
increase in profits comes from an efficiency gain, and to what extent it is driven by the 
principal’s increased ability to extract rents from the agents.  The second simulation is more 
ambitious.  It starts from the optimal non-linear income tax schedule for the actual ability 
distribution in the Unites States.  We estimate a signal distribution that people have about their 
future ability level, and examine the welfare gain from offering a choice of two non-linear tax 
schedules instead of one.  We find that, for our baseline parameters, the choice of tax schedules 
increases social welfare by the same amount as would occur from a 4.0 percent windfall gain in 
the government budget (or about $600 per filer per year).  This gain in social welfare is over two 
times as large as the gain in social welfare that comes from going from the optimal linear to the 
optimal non-linear tax schedule.  About two thirds of the increase in social welfare derives from 
the efficiency gain of offering a menu of tax schedules (the average marginal tax rate falls) while 
the remainder comes from an increase in redistribution.   
 
 
2.  Formal Results 
 
We start by considering the standard screening problem, which captures the majority of problems 
described in the literature, though only a fraction of the problems that arise in the real world.  
Consider a situation where, once an agent contracts with the principal, she receives no further 
private information, in other words, her signal is perfectly informative.  This would occur, for 
example, if a firm had to hire a salesperson with private knowledge about her capabilities, but 
those capabilities remained fixed, and the firm could monitor conditions that changed sales 
prospects, e.g., whether a potential client was recalcitrant.  In this case, i.e., where signals are 
perfectly informative or agents have perfect information about their type, offering a menu of 
schedules yields no benefit.  As Clay et al. (1992) note, if an agent always knew her type with 
certainty when selecting her schedule, she could always predict with certainty which point she 
would choose on the incentive schedule.  In that case, the principal could simply offer a single   6 
incentive schedule consisting of the set of bundles that agents end up choosing on the menu of 
schedules.  The outcome with this single incentive schedule would be identical to the outcome 
with the menu of schedules.   
  In two additional cases, offering a menu of incentive schedules offers no benefit beyond 
an optimal single non-linear schedule.  First, if there is no initial signal, or that signal is 
completely uninformative, a menu of incentive schedules yields no benefit because the agent has 
no information on which to base her choice of incentive schedule.  Second, and far less obvious, 
there is no benefit to offering a menu of schedules if there are only two types.  In a two-type 
screening model, the model most often considered in the literature, the principal makes a tradeoff 
between the cost of distorting the behavior of the low type and giving informational rents to the 
high type.
2  If the fraction of high types increases, the optimal plan raises the distortion to the 
low types so as to reduce the informational rent paid to the high types.  It does so since this 
distortion is relative cheap (few low types) and informational rent to be paid to high types is 
relatively expensive (many high types).  Thus, if an agent truthfully reports that she has a high 
signal (raising the probability she is of the high type), the optimal incentive scheme would 
reduce her informational rent should she prove to be a high type.  Similarly, upon a truthful 
report of a low signal, the optimal incentive scheme would boost the informational rent.  But this 
means that those with a high signal would have an incentive to declare falsely that they received 
a low signal.  A similar argument shows that low types would also have an incentive to declare 
falsely.  In short, it is not possible to get truthful declarations of the signals in a two-type model 
if the signals will be used to improve social welfare. 
  Proposition 1 captures these three negative cases for offering a menu of schedules:
3   
 
Proposition 1:  Offering a choice of schedules can not yield a strict welfare gain over the 
optimal single incentive schedule if any one of the following three conditions holds: (i) the signal 
is perfectly informative, (ii) the signal is completely uninformative, or (iii) there are only two 
types. 
 
                                                 
2 It is never optimal to distort the behavior of the high type, because this would reduce the surplus that can be 
extracted from her.   7 
Proof in the appendix. 
 
The remaining results in the paper exclude the conditions in Proposition 1, and assume 
that agents receive further private information after their contracts with the principal are struck, 
i.e., that the initial signals are imperfect, and that there are N types, with N ≥ 3.  To provide 
motivation and intuition, we frame the setup in terms of optimal non-linear income taxation.  
However, the framework applies immediately to a wide range of screening problems.   
 
2.1  Setup with the Optimal Single Non-Linear Schedule 
Consider the standard screening problem, i.e., one where agents receive no signals and 
the optimal single non-linear schedule is offered.  All agents derive utility from consumption, C, 
and disutility from effort, X, according to utility function U(C, X) = V(C) - F(X).  We assume that 
agents are expected-utility maximizers and that V(C) is concave and increasing in C while F(X) 
is convex and increasing in X.  Let θ denote an agent’s type (θ = 1, 2, … N), and let wθ be the 
wage or return to effort for that type.  Without loss of generality, we assume that w is increasing 
in θ.  The population fraction of each type of agent is denoted by αθ.  The principal, logically 
thought of as the government in this context, observes income Y = wθ X, but neither X nor wθ 
separately.  The principal maximizes an objective function or social welfare function given by  
Σθ αθ Φ(U(Cθ, Xθ)).  We assume that the social welfare function Φ(.) is weakly increasing and 
weakly concave; i.e., the principal wishes to redistribute resources towards the lower types.  The 
principal maximizes the objective function by offering a feasible, incentive-compatible incentive 
schedule consisting of N bundles {Cθ , Yθ}θ=1..N.  By the revelation principle, we can limit our 
analysis to direct mechanisms, those where the principal maximizes his objective function 
subject to a resource constraint (RC) and the agents’ incentive constraints (IC).  
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3 Since the single incentive schedule is a special case of a menu of incentive schedules (namely a menu with two 
identical items), the menu of schedules can by definition attain at least the social welfare achieved by a single 









       , and            (RC) 
  U(Cθ′ , Yθ′ /wθ ) - U(Cθ , Yθ/wθ ) ≤ 0   for any θ, θ′ .      (IC) 
 
While this sets up the screening problem as one where the principal maximizes his measure of 
social welfare, this is much less restrictive than it may at first seem.  Screening problems in 
which the principal maximizes profits subject to a participation constraint by the agent are a 
special case of the dual of the screening problem of a welfare-maximizing principal.  To see this, 
note that the resource constraint is simply the negative of the principal’s profits, and that setting 
the derivative of Φ(.) to zero for all but the lowest type turns the objective function into the 
participation constraint for the lowest type (which is the binding participation constraint).  
Maximizing the utility of the lowest type subject to a zero-profit constraint is merely the dual of 
maximizing profits subject to a constraint on the utility of the lowest type.  
 
2.2  Setup with Schedule Selection 
Now, we extend the standard screening problem described above by letting the agents 
receive a signal about their type, and letting the principal offer a choice of schedules to the 
agents after the agents have received their signal but before they have learned their type.  In this 
setup, the agents initially do not know their own type θ; instead they receive a signal σ, where σ 
is either equal to B (bad) or G (good).  The principal cannot observe the signal, and conditional 
on type the signal does not affect pay-offs.  Let the joint probability of being of type θ and 
receiving signal σ be denoted by αθσ.  We assume that the signals are imperfectly informative.   
The principal now offers a choice of two incentive schedules, with {CθG , YθG}θ=1..N 
intended for those with a good signal and {CθB , YθB}θ=1..N for those whose signal is bad.  After 
receiving her signal but before learning her type, the agent chooses one of the two incentive 
schedules.
4  Because the principal does not observe the signal, these incentive schedules need to 
be ex-ante incentive compatible – agents with a good signal must weakly prefer the schedule 
                                                 
4 We assume that agents are fully rational when they make this choice (i.e., they do not suffer from time-
inconsistency nor are they subject to temptation).  Miravete (2003) and Narayanan et al. (2007) provide evidence in 
the context of phone plans that consumers generally choose the best schedule for them.  DellaVigna and Malmandier 
(2006), however, show that when choosing gym memberships, consumers systematically choose contracts that are 
more expensive ex-post than other available contracts.   9 
intended for them over the schedule intended for those with a bad signal, and vice versa.  After 
learning her type, the agent chooses a point on the incentive schedule she previously selected. 
The principal’s objective function is Σθ Σσ αθσ Φ(U(Cθσ , Xθσ )).  We consider direct 
mechanisms in which the principal maximizes his objective function subject to a resource 
constraint (RC), two ex-ante incentive constraints that ensure signals are truthfully revealed, and 
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         for any σ, σ′    (Ex-Ante IC) 
U(Cθ′σ , Yθ′σ/wθ) - U(Cθσ , Yθσ/wθ) ≤ 0        for any θ, θ′, σ .  (Ex-Post IC) 
 
2.3  Results 
We express the efficiency gain from offering a menu of schedules in terms of an interim-
by-type Pareto gain, which implies a welfare or ex-ante Pareto gain.  The interim-by-type Pareto 
gain, i.e., the expected utility of each type weakly increases, is most relevant in a context, such as 
optimal taxation, where the government is concerned about redistribution across types.   
 
Proposition 2:  Posit that (i) there are at least three types, (ii) utility is separable, and (iii) the 
optimal single incentive schedule has the incentive constraints for type θ binding toward type  
θ-1, is not a corner solution, and does not involve bundling.  Then, for generic distributions of 
signals and types, there exists a menu of schedules that yields a strict first-order, interim-by-type 
Pareto improvement over the optimal single non-linear incentive schedule. 
   10 
Corollary:  The principal will offer a menu of schedules that yields a strict first-order gain to 
the principal compared to the optimal single non-linear incentive schedule. 
 
Proofs in the appendix. 
 
To understand the idea behind the proof of Proposition 2, consider the special case of three types, 
L (low), M (medium) and H (high).  We start from the optimal single incentive schedule {Ĉθ , 
Ŷθ}θ=L,M,H , which is the solution to the F.O.C.s of (1), and assume we have a standard interior 
solution (no bundling, no corner solutions, two binding incentive constraints).  In this optimal 
solution, the effort levels of the low and medium types are distorted downwards.  
The optimal single schedule is also a feasible, though generally not optimal, solution to 
the problem in which the principal can offer a menu of schedules.  Namely, the principal could 
offer a (rather limited) menu consisting of the best single incentive schedule.  Starting there, we 
examine whether we can perturb this degenerate menu of schedules to produce the desired 
interim-by-type Pareto improvement.  We denote these perturbations by lower-case letters while 
denoting the resulting non-degenerate menu of schedules by upper-case letters:  {CθB = Ĉθ + cθB, 
YθB = Ŷθ + yθB }θ=L,M,H and {CθG = Ĉθ + cθG , YθG = Ŷθ + yθG}θ=L,M,H.  We then examine 
perturbations {cθσ, yθσ}θ=L,M,H; σ=B,G such that (i) all the incentive constraints identified in (3) 
remain satisfied, and (ii) the expected utility for each type remains constant.  If such a 
perturbation relaxes the resource constraint, extra resources are available, and all types can be 
made better off.  A strict interim Pareto improvement is available.   
To find the required perturbation, we linearize all the binding incentive constraints of the 
menu of schedules problem (3) around the optimal single incentive schedule.  This imposes six 
linear constraints on the perturbation (two ex-ante incentive constrains, and two ex-post 
incentive constraints for each of the two schedules).  In addition, we linearize expected utility for 
each type around the optimal single incentive schedule and hold expected utility constant, which 
imposes three additional constraints (one for each type).  Finally, we do not perturb income for 
the high type (yHB and yHG) because the first-order conditions of (3) tell us that these should be 
set at the first-best level, as is well known to be the case for the optimal single incentive 
schedule.  In total, we impose 9 linear restrictions on a 10-dimensional perturbation.  Let ε be the 
one free parameter of the deviation, i.e., the perturbation in each choice variable is a linear   11 
function of ε.  By substituting the perturbations in the choice variables into the resource 
constraint, we determine how the perturbation affects the resource constraint, and find that the 
change in the resource constraint is proportional to ε and that the factor of proportionality is non-
zero for generic distributions of αθσ.  Because ε enters linearly, the efficiency gains are first 
order.  Since the change in the resource constraint depends on a first-order approximation of the 
effects of a perturbation in the optimal single incentive schedule, this expression only holds for 
small values of ε.  For larger values, second-order effects could become important, and could 
begin to offset the first-order gains. 
 
2.4  Intuition for the Three-Type Case with Signals Satisfying the Monotone Likelihood Property 
  The intuition is most easily understood when the signals satisfy the monotone likelihood 
property, though schedule selection can also offer welfare gains in cases where signals fail to 
satisfy this property.  When signals satisfy the monotone likelihood property, they change the 
relative likelihoods of the three types: a bad signal increases the likelihood of the low type and 
reduces the likelihood of the high type, whereas a good signal does the opposite.  The effect of 
the signal of the likelihood of a medium type is ambiguous.  We know from the screening 
literature that the optimal incentive schedule depends on the relative fractions of the types.  The 
optimal distortion to any given type decreases as its fraction in the population increases, because 
a distortion’s efficiency cost is proportional to the numbers of those it is imposed upon.  The 
optimal distortion increases with the proportion of higher types, because increasing the distortion 
reduces the informational rents paid to higher types, and these informational rents are 
proportional to the higher types’ fraction of the population.  Thus, if the population fraction or 
the likelihood of a type increases, it is optimal to both reduce the distortion to and the 
redistribution to this type. 
  Ideally, the incentive schedule conditional on a signal would reduce both the distortion 
and the redistribution to the types that become more likely conditional on that signal.  Thus, 
efficiency considerations push towards less redistribution and less distortion to the more likely 
types.  However, when signals are private this is not incentive-compatible because agents with a 
signal that makes a given type more likely would not choose a schedule that reduces 
redistribution to that type.  Thus, the incentive constraint that a signal be truthfully revealed 
pushes in the opposite direction, namely in the direction of more redistribution towards types that   12 
become more likely conditional on the signal.  With just two types, high and low, these 
contradictory forces cannot be resolved because only one type (low) is distorted.  As a result, 
offering a menu of schedules provides no benefit if there are only two types, as we proved in 
Proposition 1.   
Once three or more types are involved, the picture changes.  At least two types get 
distorted and these opposing efficiency and incentive forces no longer cancel out in general.  
With two or more types distorted, the perturbation conditional on the signal can decrease the 
distortion to one type, thereby raising efficiency and tightening the ex-ante incentive constraint, 
but increasing the distortion to the other type, which lowers efficiency but simultaneously relaxes 
the ex-ante incentive constraint.  Only for highly specific parameter values, will the effect of a 
distortion on efficiency relative to its effect on the ex-ante incentive constraint be exactly the 
same for each type.  Apart from that knife-edge case, one can increase efficiency by reducing the 
distortion that is relatively costly in terms of efficiency but has relatively little effect on the 
incentive constraint, and vice versa. 
  This intuition explains why, as the proof in the appendix shows, the perturbation always 
moves yLB and yMG in one direction but yLG and yMB in the other.  For example, if, conditional on 
a bad signal, the distortion to the low type is increased, then the distortion to the medium type 
will be decreased.  Moreover, one can show that the perturbation always moves the utility of the 
high and the low types in the opposite direction of the utility of the medium type.  This non-
monotonic effect results from reducing redistribution where the efficiency costs of redistribution 




3.  Application I: Monopolistic Utility Company Offering a Menu of Price Plans 
 
We now present a highly stylized example to illustrate how giving agents a choice of schedules 
can benefit the principal.  In this example, the principal is a profit-maximizing firm, there are just 
three types of agents, and parameter values are chosen to enhance exposition.  Section 4 presents 
a more empirically-based example in which the principal is a social-welfare maximizing 
government, the agents come from a continuum of types, and parameter values are calibrated to 
reality.   13 
  Consider a monopolistic utility company that produces an output X at a constant marginal 
cost of β.   The company, which maximizes profits, sells to consumers, who differ in how much 
they value the good.  Their valuation is determined by the taste parameter, wθ, which can take on 
three values 0 < wL < wM < wH depending on whether the agent’s type θ is L (low), M (medium) 
or H (high). The population fraction of each type of agent is denoted by αθ.  Consumer surplus is 
given by  ( , ) U X P w X P     =   .  Since there are just three types of consumers, the price plan 
consists of three points in (X, P) space. The company finds the price plan that maximizes profits: 
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     - (fixed cost),           
  s.t.  
  Uθ (Xθ , Pθ) ≥  0        for any θ, and         (IR) 
  Uθ (Xθ , Pθ) - Uθ (Xθ′ , Pθ′ ) ≥ 0   for any θ, θ′ .          (IC) 
 
Thus, in setting its price plan, the company needs to ensure that each type’s individual rationality 
constraint is satisfied (consumer surplus cannot be negative) and that all incentive constraints are 
satisfied (each type of consumer chooses the point on the price schedule intended for her). 
Next, we extend the standard screening problem described above by letting agents 
receive a signal about their type and letting the company offer a menu of schedules to the agents 
once the agents have received their signal, but before they have learned their type.  That is, 
agents receive a private signal σ, where σ takes on one of two values B (bad) or G (good).  Let 
the joint probability of receiving signal σ and being of type θ be denoted by αθσ.  In this 
application, we assume that the signals are informative and, more specifically, that they satisfy 
the monotone likelihood property: the probability of receiving a good signal increases strictly 
with type: αHG / αHB > αMG / αMB  > αLG / αLB.  In the context of a utility company, one can think 
of the agent’s type as being independently re-drawn every month from a given distribution.  The 
distribution from which the type is drawn is determined by the signal.  Thus, consumers with a 
bad signal – low users on average – draw their type each month from a distribution that is 
stochastically dominated by the distribution from which consumers with a good signal draw their 
types.    14 
The utility company now offers a choice of two price plans, with {XθG , PθG}θ=L,M,H 
intended for those with a good signal, and {XθB , PθB}θ=L,M,H  for those with a bad signal.  After 
receiving her signal but before learning her type, the consumer chooses one of the two price 
plans.  One can think of this as a one-time decision.  Because the principal can never observe the 
signal, these price plans need to be ex-ante incentive compatible – consumers with a good signal 
must prefer the plan intended for them ex-ante over the plan intended for those with a bad signal, 
and vice versa.  Each month, upon learning the draw of her type for that month, the consumer 
chooses how much output to consume – that is, she chooses a point on her previously selected 
price plan. 
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  Uθ (Xθσ, Pθσ) ≥  0            for any θ, σ,    (IR) 
, , L M H  =  αθσ[Uθ (Xθσ , Pθσ) - Uθ (Xθσ′ , Pθσ′)] ≥ 0  for any σ, σ′, and  (Ex-Ante IC) 
Uθ (Xθσ , Pθσ) - Uθ (Xθ′σ , Pθ′σ) ≥ 0      for any θ, θ′, σ .  (Ex-Post IC) 
 
  We calculated the optimal single price plan and the optimal menu of price plans for a 
marginal cost (β) equal to 1 and taste parameters wL =12, wM =15, wH = 20.  Given this marginal 
cost and these taste parameters, the first-best consumption levels are 36, 56.25 and 100. The joint 
distribution of signals and types is chosen as: 
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In other words, the unconditional probability of each signal is one half and the unconditional 
probability of each type is one third.  However, conditional on a good signal, the consumer is 
nine times more likely to be of the high type than of the low type, and vice versa for a bad signal.   15 
The circles in Figure 2 show the choices for the three types under the optimal single non-
linear price plan. That plan produces three quantity-price combinations: 9 units for a price of 36 
(chosen by the low type), 25 units for a price of 66 (chosen by the medium type) and 100 units 
for a total price of 166 (chosen by the high type).  The figure also plots the indifference curves 
for the three types.  These curves show that the high type is indifferent between the bundle of the 
high type and the one for the medium type.  In other words, the incentive constraint for the high 
type binds.  Similarly, the incentive constraint binds for the medium type.  Finally, the low type 
is indifferent between its bundle and not purchasing at all, showing that the individual rationality 
constraint binds for the low type.   
Panel A of Table 1 shows quantity sold, revenue, consumer surplus, producer surplus and 
social surplus associated with the optimal single non-linear price plan.  The utility company 
maximizes profits by distorting the consumption of low and medium types downwards, but 
setting the consumption level for the high type at its first-best level.  This is the standard result in 
this type of screening model – the distortion to the lower types allows the principal to charge a 
higher price from the high type because the distortion makes it less attractive for the high type to 
select a quantity-price combination intended for a lower type.  We find that the consumption 
level for the medium type is distorted strongly downwards from a first-best level of 56.25 to 25, 
which is the same distortion as would be caused by a 50% tax on the consumption good.  The 
distortion to the low type is even more severe.  Its consumption is distorted downwards by a 
factor of 4 (from 36 to 9), which is the same distortion as would be caused by a 100% tax on the 
consumption good. 
The optimal menu of non-linear price plans consists of two plans: one plan is preferred 
by those who received a bad signal (σ=B), and the other is preferred by those who received a 
good signal (σ=G). The triangles in Figure 2 show the price-quantity combinations for the plan 
chosen by those with a good signal while the diamonds show the plan chosen by those with the 
bad signal. Panel B of Table 1 shows the outcomes associated with this menu of price plans.  The 
consumption level for the high type in the menu of plans remains at the first-best level, as was 
also the case in the single price plan.  Compared to the optimal single price plan, however, the 
price plan chosen by those with a good signal increases the distortion to the low type so as to 
extract more rent from and reduce the distortion to the medium type.  Since relatively few 
individuals receiving a good signal are of the low type, the efficiency cost of the increased   16 
distortion to the low type is relatively low, while the efficiency gain that comes from reducing 
the distortion to the medium type is relatively large.  In contrast, the plan chosen by those getting 
a bad signal curtails the distortion of the low type, but increases the distortion to the medium 
type.  The increased distortion to the medium type allows the monopolist to reduce the surplus 
going to the high type, which ensures that this plan is unattractive to those with a good signal 
(among whom the fraction of high types will be high).  Indeed, this consideration is important as 
those with a good signal are indifferent between the price plan for those with a good signal and 
the price plan for those with a bad signal (see row 5 of panel B). 
In this example, the menu of plans allows the utility company to increase its profit as a 
fraction of sales by about one percentage point.  Given that profits are typically around 5%-10% 
of sales, this boosts profits by roughly 10% to 20%.  This increase in profits is made possible by 
two factors.  First, the menu of price plans gives the utility company an additional mechanism for 
extracting surplus from consumers.  Since the utility company has no concern for efficiency per 
se, it will still extract additional surplus even if the efficiency cost of doing so is extremely high.  
Second, for a given amount of surplus going to consumers, the menu of price plans allows the 
utility company to make the price plans more efficient.  Table 2 disentangles these two effects 
for five different pricing mechanisms.  These pricing mechanisms include two infeasible ones, 
namely first-best (requires that types be observable) and non-linear pricing conditional on signal 
(requires that signals be observable).  These two infeasible pricing mechanisms provide a 
theoretical benchmark.  The three feasible schedules presented are the menu of non-linear price 
plans, the single non-linear price plan, and the single linear price plan.  The two non-linear price 
plans are the focus of this paper, while the linear price plan, which is a two-part tariff consisting 
of a base price plus a price per unit of consumption, serves as a comparison. 
The first three columns show consumer surplus, profit and deadweight loss produced by 
these five pricing mechanisms when there is no constraint on consumer surplus.  Not 
surprisingly, profits decrease monotonically as we move down these five pricing mechanisms, 
because, as we move down the list, successively more constraints are imposed on the pricing 
mechanisms (in order, we add: type is unobservable, signal is unobservable, only one plan can be 
offered, the plan must be linear).  
As pricing mechanisms become more constrained, two tendencies emerge:  First, 
consumer surplus tends to rise, which makes sense given that a more constrained schedule makes   17 
it harder for the utility company to extract surplus from the consumers.  Second, the deadweight 
loss tends to rise.  These tendencies are reflected in the table, with two exceptions.  First, as we 
move from the menu of non-linear price plans to the single non-linear price plan, the deadweight 
loss falls.  Apparently, constraining the pricing mechanism to a single plan eliminates some very 
distortionary ways of extracting surplus from consumers, leading to an overall drop in 
deadweight loss.  Second, the linear price plan lowers consumer surplus compared to the single 
non-linear plan.    
To disentangle the inherent efficiency effects of the pricing mechanisms from the effects 
caused by a change in the amount of surplus extracted from consumers, the last three columns 
show the effect of the pricing mechanism on profits and DWL when consumer surplus is 
constrained to remain at the level associated with the single non-linear plan.  Such constraint 
might be put in place, for example, were a regulator considering letting the monopolist move to 
the choice-of-plans format.  Here we find that the menu of non-linear prices indeed allows the 
company to raise its profits without reducing consumer surplus.  In other words, the menu of 
non-linear price plans is also inherently more efficient, even though unimpeded the company will 
squander these gains in the service of higher profits.  
 
 
4.  Application II: Menu of Income Tax Schedules 
 
Whether the metric be monies paid, people covered, or deadweight loss imposed, the tax-and-
transfer system is probably the preeminent schedule for individuals in the United States and in 
most developed nations.  It has also received considerable attention from economists.  Thus we 
select it for our second application, and assess the welfare gains that could be reaped if the 
government offered people a menu of tax-and-transfer schedules before they earned income in a 
period.  We define income taxes broadly, including means-tested transfers that in effect are 
negative income taxes.  
Following Mirrlees (1971), we assess the design of the optimal income tax as a screening 
problem: the government maximizes social welfare by redistributing income across agents whose 
differing ability (or skill) levels are private information.  There is a continuum of abilities or 
types.  We follow Mirrlees with one major exception.  His analysis was static: agents’ ability 
levels were known to them at the outset and stayed constant.  In contrast, we specifically assume   18 
that agents secure additional private information about their ability after they select a tax 
schedule.  We employ the term “later learning” for such situations.  Golosov, Kocherlakota, 
Tsyvinski (2003), Kocherlakota (2005), Albanesi and Sleet (2006), Battaglini and Coate (2006), 
and Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) have expanded Mirrlees’ static setup in a related direction; 
they allow unobserved ability to vary over time.  Thus, they too allow for later learning, but in 
their setup ability actually changes whereas in our setup ability does not change; individuals 
merely learn more about their ability over time. 
 In either later-learning situation, offering a menu of schedules can be beneficial if 
individuals have some, but imperfect, private information about their future ability.  In the 
framework with time-varying abilities, the government could allow individuals to repeatedly 
choose a tax schedule (say for the coming year or the coming 5 years).  In the static later-
learning situation, where ability is constant but only learned over time, the choice of tax 
schedules would be offered once, namely at a point in time when the agent has some but not 
perfect information about her ability.   
In this analysis, we follow Mirrlees’ static setup of the optimal income tax problem and 
augment it with a one-time choice of tax schedules for a group of individuals who are initially 
indistinguishable to the government, or amongst whom the government is not permitted to 
distinguish.  Using U.S. data, we calculate the welfare gains that would accrue were a menu of 
schedules offered, as opposed to a single schedule for all.  To compute the welfare gains reaped, 
we first need to find the optimal schedule for the base case, namely the optimal single non-linear 
income tax schedule for the U.S.  To do this, we follow the general approach of Saez (2001).  
Thus, we use the actual distribution of wage earnings of joint-filers in the 1999 public-use tax 
file and assume, following Saez, that the upper right tail of the earnings distribution is a Pareto 
distribution with parameter 2.
5  The distribution of earnings of couples with labor earnings is 
depicted in Figure 3.  
We use this earnings distribution to derive the distribution of unobserved ability levels.  
The unobserved ability level is the pre-tax wage when wages are measured as compensation per 
unit of effort (not necessarily per hour).  We use a standard iso-elastic labor supply function with 
                                                 
5  The tax file does not separate out the earnings of each individual of couples who file jointly.  Rather than 
attributing earnings across individuals, we will treat couples as one unit with a single utility function.  We exclude 
the 15% of couples without substantive (>$1000/yr) labor income. The vast majority of these are retired couples, 
and they are beyond the scope of the optimal income tax model.   19 
a labor supply elasticity of ε: X=w
  , where X denotes effort or labor supply and w denotes 
ability or the pre-tax wage.  Following Saez, we approximate the current tax system as one with 
a constant marginal rate of 40%.  We can now infer the pre-tax wage from observed earnings, 
since we know that total pre-tax earnings equal the pre-tax wage times the labor supply as a 
function of the after-tax wage:  Y = w X((1-τ)w) = 
1 (1 ) w
     
+   , where Y denotes pre-tax earnings 
and τ denotes the marginal tax rate.  This relationship between Y and w allows us to infer the 
distribution of unobserved ability from the distribution of earnings.  The inferred cumulative 
distribution of ability levels is denoted by G(w), while the corresponding density function is 
denoted by g(w). 
We use a quasi-linear utility function U(C, X) = 
1 1/
1 C X
   
 
+
+   .  We then solve the 
standard Mirrlees optimal tax problem, in which the government designs a non-linear tax 
schedule.  That schedule is implicitly defined by relating consumption and income, C(w) and 
Y(w), as a function of ability.  The government sets the tax schedule to maximize social welfare 
subject to the resource constraint (RC) and an incentive constraint (IC):     
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where Φ(.) is the social welfare function and E is government consumption.  In the screening 
problem with continuous types, the incentive constraint becomes the condition that the after-tax 
tax wage rate (w C'/Y') equals the marginal disutility of labor (UX /UC); that is, agents locally 
have no incentive to deviate from choosing the bundle intended for them.  We follow Saez 
(2001) by setting government consumption, E, equal to 25% of pre-tax income.  Since the 
government budget is balanced, net tax revenue is also equal to 25% of pre-tax income.  We 
posit a logarithmic social welfare function.   20 
We solve this problem using the dynamic programming approach developed by Mirrlees 
(1971), and extended by Saez (2001).  This yields a system of two differential equations, which 
we solve numerically.  We compute the optimal single non-linear income tax schedule to provide 
a basis of comparison for our menu-of-schedules approach.  Hence, we will present it below, 
after we first calculate the menu of optimal non-linear tax schedules. 
  The cornerstone of our approach is that individuals get an imperfect signal on their 
ability.  We take a person’s decision whether or not to attend college as a proxy for the signal the 
person received about his or her ability.   We can then calculate the fraction of individuals at 
each earnings level that went to college, and take that as the fraction of people at that earnings 
level that received a good signal.  Because the optimal tax schedules are calculated for joint 
filers, we define a good signal as both individuals in the couple having at least some college 
education.  Because people probably know more about their likely ability than is reflected in 
their choice of going to college, we consider this proxy to be a lower bound on the 
informativeness of the signal.   
We use the 5% Public Use Micro Sample from the 2000 Census to estimate the 
probability of having received a good signal as a function of position in the cumulative earnings 
distribution.  The circles on Figure 4 show these probabilities by percentile in the earnings 
distribution using data from 2.3 million couples in the 2000 Census.  We fit a 3
rd order 
polynomial (solid line) through these probabilities, and will use this polynomial as the “weakly 
informative” signal distribution in the simulations.  Under this signal distribution, the lowest 
earner (lowest ability type) has an 18% chance of receiving a good signal, the highest earner has 
an 87% chance of a good signal, while the unconditional probability of a good signal is 45%.  
The precision of the signal distribution, defined as the probability that the signal correctly 
predicts the person to be in the top 45% of the earnings distribution, is 63%.  This 63% should be 
compared to a precision of 50% for a completely random signal and a precision of 100% for a 
completely informative signal.  In short, this signal distribution is only weakly informative about 
future earnings.  Because we believe this “weakly informative” signal distribution may 
underestimate the precision of the true signal distribution, we also use two more informative 
signal distributions, also plotted in Figure 4.  The “medium informative” signal distribution is 
formed by keeping the unconditional probability of a good signal at 45% but increasing the 
signal’s average precision by 10% (from 63% to 69%) and by letting the signals at the extremes   21 
of the ability distribution have a precision of 95% (rather than about 85% in the weakly 
informative distribution).  Finally, the “strongly informative” signal distribution is a symmetric 
distribution where the probability of a good signal is 50% and where the precision at the 
extremes is 99%.   
Using Bayes’ rule to combine the earnings distribution from administrative tax data 
(Figure 3) with the probability of a good signal conditional on position in the earnings 
distribution (Figure 4), we find the earnings distributions conditional on the signal received.  
Figure 5 plots these distributions for the medium informative signal distribution.  As before, 
given a labor supply function, the underlying ability distribution can be inferred from the 
earnings distribution.  This yields the underlying ability distributions conditional on the signal 
received: g(w|σ), where σ equals G for a good signal and B otherwise.    
We now adapt the standard Mirrlees problem to allow for a choice of tax schedules so as 
to assess the improvement.  The government now offers two schedules: {C(w, G), Y(w, G)} for 
those who announce a good signal and {C(w, B), Y(w, B)} for those who announce a bad signal.  
Formally, the government solves the following maximization:   
 
( )
{ ( , ), ( , ),
( , ), ( , )}
( ( , ), ( , )/ ) ( | ) Max
C w B Y w B
w
C w G Y w G
U C w Y w w g w dw  
 
               
  s.t. 
  ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( | ) 0
w
C w Y w g w dw E  
 
          +               (RC) 
 
( ( , ), ( , )/ ) '( , )
0 ,
( ( , ), ( , )/ ) '( , )
X
C
U C w Y w w C w
w w
U C w Y w w Y w
     
 
     
+ =   ,       (Ex-Post IC) 
( ) ( ( , '), ( , ')) ( ( , ), ( , )) ( | ) 0 , '
w
U C w C w U C w C w g w dw                         (Ex-Ante IC) 
 
The resource constraint (RC) and the ex-post incentive constraint are the same as in the 
standard Mirrlees problem, except that the RC is summed over signals, and the ex-post incentive 
constraints are conditional on the signal.  In addition, there are now two ex-ante incentive 
constraints that ensure that the signal is truthfully revealed.  Once again we invoke the dynamic 
programming techniques employed in the standard Mirrlees problem.  This yields a system of 
two differential equations for each signal, but these systems of differential equations are   22 
interlinked and different from the one in the standard Mirrlees problem because of the ex-ante 
incentive constraints.  The systems of differential equations are solved numerically. 
We now turn to the comparison we sought, namely between the optimal single tax 
schedule and the pair of optimal tax schedules contingent on the announced signal.  Figure 6 
shows the total tax paid as a function of earnings for the three situations, where labor supply 
elasticity is assumed to equal 0.5 and the signal-dependent schedules are based on the medium 
informative signal distribution.  We express the total tax as a fraction of the consumption level 
under the optimal single schedule.
6   The optimal single schedule has a transfer level of $13,467 
per year at no income, the optimal schedule conditional on a bad signal starts at $15,395 and the 
optimal schedule conditional on a good signal starts at $10,235.  Thus, as the figure shows, the 
tax schedule for those with a bad signal starts off with a relatively high level of transfers and 
relatively low marginal rates, but around $50,000 of earnings the marginal tax rate starts to rise 
relatively steeply, and beyond $100,000 of earnings those with a low signal pay more tax than 
those with a high signal.  This excess tax above $100,000 is what prevents those receiving a 
good signal from pretending they received a bad signal. 
Figure 7 shows more clearly that the marginal tax rates for those with a bad signal are 
lower than the marginal tax rates of the single schedule when earnings are low, but become very 
high at high levels of earnings.  In contrast, the marginal tax rates for those with a good signal 
are lower than the marginal tax rates of the single schedule when earnings are high.  Thus, 
effectively, those with a high signal purchase low marginal tax rates in their likely earnings 
range.  The price to them is a low transfer level and high initial marginal tax rates.  For either 
signal, the menu of tax schedules offers relatively low marginal rates for the earnings range 
where the agent is most likely to be given her signal.  This feature drives the efficiency gains that 
come from offering a menu of schedules.  These relationships between marginal and average 
rates over various ranges are the norm with schedule selection applied to optimal income 
taxation. 
Figure 8 plots the marginal tax rate as a function of an agent’s percentile in the 
unconditional ability distribution.  It also plots the expected marginal tax rate conditional on the 
                                                 
6 We need to divide the total tax by consumption or income in order to create a graph that is easily comprehensible.  
Dividing by income results in average tax rates going to minus infinity at low income levels.  Because own 
consumption differs by schedule, dividing by own consumption is not desirable.  Hence, we divide all three 
schedules by the consumption level that the agent would have received under the single schedule.    23 
agent’s type (computed by taking a weighted average of the two schedules)
7.  This shows that, 
for each level of unobserved ability, the expected marginal tax rate is lower for the menu of 
schedules than it is for the optimal single schedule.  This reduction in the expected marginal tax 
rate generates the efficiency gain secured from offering a choice of tax schedules. 
  Figure 9 shows the redistributive effects of a menu of schedules.  It plots the log 
difference in utility at each ability level between the single schedule and each of the signal-
dependent schedules.  Because the social welfare function is logarithmic, the average across 
signals of the log change in utility also represents the contribution to social welfare of offering a 
choice of tax schedules. The figure shows that those with low ability levels gain on average, as 
do those with the highest ability levels.  However, the social welfare of the upper middle class is 
lower with menu of tax schedules than with the single schedule. 
Table 3 shows the effect of offering a menu of tax schedules on behavior, characteristics 
of the tax schedule, welfare, and efficiency for our baseline parameter assumptions (medium 
informative signal distribution and a labor supply elasticity of 0.5).   In panel A, the comparison 
is made holding net government revenue (= government expenditure) constant.  This is the 
relevant comparison when evaluating the effects of introducing a menu of schedules.  We find 
that offering a menu of schedules reduces the marginal tax by 3.8 percentage points on average, 
which produces increased average earnings and consumption.  This reduction in average 
marginal tax rates reduces DWL by 12.1 percent, which is equivalent to $440 per tax filer or 2.8 
percent of government revenue.  The menu of schedules not only increases efficiency, it also 
allows the government to redistribute more towards lower ability types, as was evident in Figure 
9.  The combined effect of the efficiency gain and the increased redistribution is to increase 
social welfare by 2.4%.  Panel B provides an alternative metric for this welfare gain.  It asks how 
much more revenue can the government raise when it offers a menu of schedules compared to 
the optimal single schedule if it holds social welfare constant.  The answer to this question is 
$636 per filer per year, or about 4.0 percent of tax revenue.  In other words, offering a menu of 
schedules yields the same gain in social welfare as would a 4.0 percent windfall gain in 
government revenue.  
                                                 
7 The weighted average is calculated as the square root of the weighted mean of the squared tax rates associated with 
each type, where the weights are the fractions of each type at that level of ability.  We do this because deadweight 
loss is proportional to the square of the tax rate.   24 
  In Table 4, we compare the optimal single non-linear schedule to three alternative 
schedules.  Panel A shows that the welfare gain of offering a menu of taxes would rise to 4.5 
percent if the government could observe the signal.  Since the welfare gain is only 2.3 percent 
when the signal is unobservable, roughly half of the potential welfare gain of offering a menu of 
schedules is foregone because of the need to satisfy the ex-ante incentive constraints.  The 
government can observe the signal when it consists of having attained some college education.  
However, by treating the signal as unobservable, we ensure that offering a menu of tax schedules 
will not affect the individuals’ incentives to go to college.  It thus makes sense to treat observable 
signals that are reflections of endogenous decisions as unobservable to the government.  A 
number of recent papers have examined the benefits of making the tax schedule dependent on 
exogenous characteristics such as age, height, and gender (Kremer 2001, Alesina et al. 2007, 
Mankiw and Weinzierl 2007, and Weinzierl 2007).  Mankiw and Wienzierl note that the idea of 
conditioning tax schedules based on exogenous characteristics such as height generates 
considerable opposition.  These authors explore a number of reasons for this opposition, but 
much such opposition would vanish if the people of different heights chose to be on different tax 
schedules rather than were forced to be on a different schedule.  Offering a choice of schedules 
would yield a smaller welfare gain than forcing people onto different schedules, but this 
reduction in the size of the welfare gain may be acceptable if it makes it politically feasible to 
use multiple schedules. 
We saw in Table 3 that the expected utility of those with a good signal is lower under a 
menu of schedules than under the optimal single schedule.  Thus, at the point when agents know 
their signal but not their type, all those with a good signal would oppose moving from the 
optimal single schedule to a choice of schedules.  If the support of those with a good signal is 
needed for political feasibility, the government needs to offer a menu of schedules that offers an 
interim-by-signal Pareto improvement.  That is, conditional on her signal (but before learning her 
type), each agent must expect to achieve a higher level of utility when given the menu of 
schedules.  Panel B of Table 4 shows that this additional restriction on the choice of tax 
schedules would reduce the welfare gain of offering a choice of schedules from 2.3% to 1.9%. 
  To place the welfare gain from offering a choice in tax schedules in perspective, we also 
calculated the welfare gain of going from the optimal linear schedule to the optimal non-linear 
schedule.  Panel C of Table 4 shows that this welfare gain to be 1.0 percent, implying that the   25 
welfare gain from offering a menu of tax schedules is about twice as large as the gain from 
offering a single non-linear rather than a single linear schedule.   
  Table 5 explores the sensitivity of the welfare and efficiency gains to assumptions about 
the labor supply elasticity and the informativeness of the signal distribution.   Row 5 reproduces 
the results for our baseline assumptions. Offering a menu of schedules leads to a welfare gain of 
2.4 percent, which is the same welfare gain that would be reaped were there a windfall gain to 
the government budget of 4.0 percent or $636 per filer.  The efficiency gains from offering a 
menu of schedules are equivalent to 2.8 percent of the government budget or $440 per filer, and 
thus account for more than half of the welfare gain.  Increased redistribution accounts for the 
remainder of the welfare gain.  Rows 4 and 6 show that the welfare gains are quite sensitive to 
the informativeness of the signal distribution.  The welfare and efficiency gains are about one 
fifth as great for the weakly informative signal distribution as for the medium informative signal 
distribution, while the strongly informative signal distribution yields welfare and efficiency gains 
that are about 30 percent larger than in the base case.  In contrast, the results are relatively 
insensitive to assumptions about the labor supply elasticity.  The welfare and efficiency gains in 
absolute dollars are about 30 percent lower when the labor supply elasticity is 0.2 and about 30 
percent higher when the labor supply elasticity is 1.0.  These effects are much less than 
proportional to the labor supply elasticity because the optimal tax rate also decreases as the labor 
supply elasticity increases.  Overall, the table shows that even under relatively conservative 
assumptions about the labor supply elasticity and the informativeness of the signal distribution, 
offering a menu of schedules will still yield worthwhile welfare and efficiency gains.  
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
In a wide variety of settings, principals let agents select their incentive schedule from a menu of 
schedules.  The advantages are diverse.  It may be an alternative way of presenting a single 
complicated non-linear schedule (Alesina and Weil, 1992).  The principal may use a menu of 
schedules to take advantage of agents’ time-consistency problems or other behavioral anomalies 
(Esteban and Miyagawa 2005, Eliaz and Spiegler 2006, 2007, or Grubb 2007).  We explore a 
quite different rationale for offering a menu of schedules in a setting where agents are fully 
rational:  Where agents acquire more information about their type over time, offering the agent a   26 
choice of schedules at the point where the agent’s private information about his own type is 
imperfect will generically be beneficial to the principal.   
We make two main theoretical contributions beyond the existing literature that compares 
menus of schedules to the optimal single non-linear schedule in settings with fully rational agents 
(Baron and Besanko 1984, Miravete 2005, and Courty and Li 2000).  The first contribution is our 
result that, generically, the benefit to the principal of offering a menu of schedules is strict and 
first-order.  Schedule selection benefits the principal because it allows the principal to screen the 
types more efficiently. Our second contribution is our result that this efficiency gain can, in 
principle, be used to achieve a first-order interim-by-type Pareto improvement.  Efficiency gains 
emerge because the menu of schedules induces each type to select the schedule that contains 
relatively few distortions to the action that that type is likely to take.  In addition, a menu of 
schedules benefits the principal because it gives him a more flexible tool to redistribute rents to 
suit his objectives, namely more profits if the principal is a profit-maximizing company, or more 
income redistribution if the principal is a government maximizing a redistributive social welfare 
function.  Generally, this redistribution of rents means that the menu of schedules that the 
principal selects will not Pareto dominate the optimal single incentive schedule. 
Our empirical contribution is to empirically assess the possible benefits of schedule 
selection in a tax setting.  To do so, we compared the optimal non-linear income tax schedule for 
the U.S. to the optimal menu of two non-linear tax schedules.  For our baseline parameter 
choices, we found that offering a choice of tax-schedules would boost social welfare by 2.4%.  
To put this welfare gain in perspective, it is equivalent to the welfare gains under the optimal 
single schedule of a windfall gain to the government budget of 4.0 percent or $636 per filer.  To 
provide another metric, the welfare gain from offering a menu of schedules is more than twice as 
large as the welfare gain from going from the optimal linear to the optimal non-linear tax 
schedule, a topic that has received considerable attention in the economics literature.  Our 
simulation of the welfare gain admittedly relies on many assumptions.  Nevertheless, we believe 
that it shows that schedule selection has the potential to yield significant welfare gains.   
Three decades ago, nonlinear schedules started to receive considerable research attention, 
and research findings and practical applications proliferated side by side.  Schedule selection, an 
equivalently promising technology, has had limited but important real world applications.  If it is 
to reach its potential, it now merits much greater attention in both research and practice.   27 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
The proofs of parts (i) and (ii) are immediate (as explained in the body of the paper). Below 
follows the proof to part (iii). 
 
Suppose that schedule SM = {CLB, YLB, CLG, YLG, CHB, YHB, CHG, YHG} is an optimal menu of 
incentive schedules that satisfies the resource constraint, ex-ante incentive constraints and the ex-
post incentive constraints.  This incentive schedule yields social welfare of: 
 
V(SM)    =  αLB Φ(U(CLB,YLB/wL))  + αLG Φ(U(CLG,YLG/wL)) +  
       αHB Φ(U(CHB,YHB/wH)) + αHG Φ(U(CHG,YHG/wH)) 
 
and satisfies the following resource and incentive constraints:  
 
αLB(CLB-YLB)  + αLG(CLG-YLG) + αHB(CHB-YHB) + αHG(CHG-YHG) ≤ 0 
 
αLG/αG (U(CLB,YLB/wL)  - U(CLG,YLG/wL)) + αHG/αG (U(CHB,YHB/wH) - U(CHG,YHG/wH))  ≤ 0  
αLB/αB (U(CLG,YLG/wL)  - U(CLB,YLB/wL)) + αHB/αB (U(CHG,YHG/wH) - U(CHB,YHB/wH))  ≤ 0  
 
U(CLB,YLB/wH)- U(CHB,YHG/wH) ≤ 0 
U(CLG,YLG/wH)- U(CHG,YHG/wH) ≤ 0 
 
Using the identities αHG/αG = 1-αLG/αG and αHB/αB = 1- αLB/αB , adding the two ex-ante incentive 
constraints yields: 
 
(1-αLG/αG) (U(CHB,YHB/wH) - U(CHG,YHG/wH)) + αLG/αG (U(CLB,YLB/wL)  - U(CLG,YLG/wL)) + 




(-αLG/αG)(U(CHB,YHB/wH)-U(CHG,YHG/wH)) + αLG/αG (U(CLB,YLB/wL)-U(CLG,YLG/wL)) + 




Since (αLG/αG - αLB/αB) < 0, this implies: 
 
(A.1)  U(CHG,YHG/wH) - U(CHB,YHB/wH) ≥ U(CLG,YLG/wL)  - U(CLB,YLB/wL)   
 
Next, we prove by contradiction that U(CLG,YLG/wL) - U(CLB,YLB/wL) ≤ 0.  Suppose that 
U(CLG,YLG/wL)  - U(CLB,YLB/wL) > 0. Then, the following ex-ante incentive constraint  
 
αHB/αB (U(CHG,YHG/wH) - U(CHB,YHB/wH)) + αLB/αB (U(CLG,YLG/wL)  - U(CLB,YLB/wL))  ≤ 0  
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implies that αHB/αB (U(CHG,YHG/wH) - U(CHB,YHB/wH)) < 0.  But this contradicts equation (A.1). 
Hence, it follows that  
 
(A.2)    U(CLG,YLG/wL)  - U(CLB,YLB/wL) ≤ 0 
 
Now consider a single incentive schedule, i.e., a schedule that is independent of the signal. 
Hence, it consists of two consumption/income bundles:  
 
SS = {CL, YL, CH, YH} 
 
Let this incentive schedule be defined by: 
 
YL= (αLBYLB + αLGYLG)/ αL 
YH= (αHBYHB + αHGYHG)/ αH 
CL= (αLBCLB + αLGCLG)/ αL - P 
CH= (αHBCHB + αHGCHG)/ αH 
 
where P ≥ 0 is the solution to: 
 
(A.3)    αLBU(CLB,YLB/wL) + αLGU(CLG,YLG/wL) =  αL U(CL,YL/wL)  
 
By concavity of U(), the agent prefers the mean consumption-exertion bundle over the lottery.  
Hence, she is willing to pay a positive premium (P ≥ 0) to obtain the mean consumption-exertion 
bundle.  
 
Next, we show that SS, the single schedule, satisfies the resource and incentive constraints but 
weakly increases social welfare, and that therefore the optimal menu of schedules, SM, offers no 
benefit over the single incentive schedule. 
 
V(SM)  =     αLB Φ(U(CLB,YLB/wL)  + αLG Φ(U(CLG,YLG/wL) +  
αHB Φ(U(CHB,YHB/wH) + αHG Φ(U(CHG,YHG/wH) 
 
  ≤           (by concavity of Φ) 
 
αL Φ((αLB/αL)U(CL,YL/wL)+(αLG/αL)U(CLG,YLG/wL)) +  
αHB Φ(U(CHB,YHB/wH) + αHG Φ(U(CHG,YHG/wH)     
 
  =          (by definition of P) 
 
αL Φ(U(CL,YL/wL)) +  
αHB Φ(U(CHB,YHB/wH) + αHG Φ(U(CHG,YHG/wH) 
 
  ≤           (by concavity of U) 
 
αL Φ(U(CL,YL/wL) + αH Φ(U(CH,YH/wH)  =    V(SS) 
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Hence, social welfare is weakly higher for SS than for SM.  The resource constraint of SS is 
satisfied: 
 
αLB(CL-YL) + αLG(CL-YL) + αHB(CH-YH) + αHG (CH-YH)  
= αLB(CLB-P-YLB) + αLG(CLG-P-YLG) + αHB(CHB-YHB) + αHG(CHG-YHG) 
≤ αLB(CLB-YLB)  + αLG(CLG-YLG) + αHB(CHB-YHB) + αHG(CHG-YHG) ≤ 0 
 
where the equality sign follows from the definition of SS, the first inequality sign follows from P 
≥ 0 and the final inequality follows from SM satisfying the resource constraint.  The schedule SM 
satisfies the following two ex-post incentive constraints: 
 
U(CLB,YLB/wH)- U(CHB,YHG/wH) ≤ 0 
U(CLG,YLG/wH)- U(CHG,YHG/wH) ≤ 0 
 
Hence, taking a linear combination we have:   
 
(αHB/αH)[U(CLB,YLB/wH)- U(CHB,YHB/wH)] + (αHG/αH) [U(CLG,YLG/wH)- U(CHG,YHG/wH)]   ≤ 0 
 
by concavity of U, this implies: 
 




(αLB/αL)U(CLB,YLB/wH) + (αLG/αL)  U(CLG,YLG/wH)  + (αHB/αH - αLB/αL)U(CLB,YLB/wH) + (αHG/αH - 
αLG/αL)U(CLG,YLG/wH) – U(CH,YH/wH) ≤ 0 
 
using the identities αHB/αH = 1 - αHG/αH and αLB/αL = 1 - αLG/αL, we have:  
 
(αLB / αL)U(CLB,YLB/wH) + (αLG / αL)  U(CLG,YLG/wH) +(αHB/αH - αLB/αL)(U(CLB,YLB/wH) -
U(CLG,YLG/wH)) – U(CH,YH/wH) ≤ 0 
 
Because signals are informative, a high type is less likely to receive a bad signal than a low type, 
so (αHB/αH - αLB/αL) ≤ 0.  Moreover, from equation (A.2), we know that (U(CLB,YLB/wH) -
U(CLG,YLG/wH)) ≤ 0. Thus, the inequality is preserved if we drop the product of these to terms, 
which is positive: 
 
(A.4)  (αLB/αL)U(CLB,YLB/wH) + (αLG/αL) U(CLG,YLG/wH) – U(CH,YH/wH) ≤ 0 
 
Now note that by construction (see eq. A.3), we have:  
 
(αLB/αL)U(CLB,YLB/wL) + (αLG/αL) U(CLG,YLG/wL) = U(CL,YL/wL) 
 
Substituting this equation into (A.4), we get: 
 
U(CL,YL/wH) – U(CH,YH/wH) ≤ 0   32 
Thus, the IC is satisfied for this incentive schedule that does not rely on declarations of the 
signal.  We showed earlier that this single incentive schedule satisfies the resource constraint and 
yields a weak welfare improvement over the optimal menu of schedules.  Hence, a menu of 
schedules is never necessary to maximize social welfare if there are only two types.   
 
Proof of Proposition 2 and its corollary 
To prove proposition 2, we show that a menu of schedules can be formed by applying a specific 
perturbation to the optimal single incentive schedule and that this perturbation yields the desired 
interim Pareto improvement.  It turns out that we can restrict our attention to a particular class of 
perturbations, namely those in which (i) the labor supply (or effort) of types 3 through N is held 
constant and (ii) the change in utility is the same for types 3 through N.  Because we consider 
perturbations to labor supply of the lowest two types, we first need to derive the optimal levels of 
labor supply for these types under the single optimal incentive schedule. We use the assumption 
that the utility function is separable in order to rewrite U(C, X) = V(C)-F(X).  It is convenient to 
define Zθ(Y) = F(Yθ/wθ), so that we can write U(C , Y/wθ ) = V(C) - Zθ(Y).  Moreover, we assume 
that we have a standard interior solution with the resource constraint holding with equality and 
without bundling (i.e., each type has a distinct bundle at the optimum). Because the utility 
function satisfies the single crossing property, only the incentive constraints of type θ  towards 
type θ-1 may bind.  We assume that Φ(V(.)) is sufficiently concave that these constraints indeed 
bind. (If this were not the case, the principal could redistribute without distorting labor supply, 
which is not a relevant case).  We can thus rewrite the optimization problem as:  
 
(A.5)  ( )
, 1.. { }
1
Max ( ) ( )
N
N
C Y V C Z Y
     
       
 
   
= =
    ,                 
s.t.  








  =   , and           
      ( ) ( ) 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 V C Z Y V C Z Y                       =      for θ = 2 .. N.   
 
Let the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint be denoted by µ0 and the Lagrange 
multiplier on the incentive constraint of type θ+1 toward the bundle of type θ  by µθ.   The first-
order conditions associated with (C1, C2, … , CN, Y1 and Y2) are : 
    
(A.6a)    α1 µ0  + (α1 ϕ1  + µ1) v1                 = 0, 
(A.6b)    α2 µ0  + (α2 ϕ2  + µ2 + µ1) v2          = 0, 
(A.6c)    αθ µ0   + (αθ ϕθ  + µθ - µθ-1 ) vθ        = 0    for θ = 3 .. N  (and where µN = 0), 
(A.6d)    -α1 µ0  -  (α1 ϕ1  + µ1 r2) z11            = 0,                   
(A.6e)   -α2 µ0  -  (α2 ϕ2  - µ1 + µ2 r3) z22     = 0,                     
 
where vθ denotes dV(Cθ)/dCθ, or the marginal utility of consumption evaluated at the 
consumption level of type θ, and zθ'θ denotes dZθ (Yθ')/dYθ' , or type’s θ marginal disutility of 
earning income evaluated at the income level of type θ'. Let rθ be the ratio [dZθ (Yθ-1)/dYθ-1] / 
[dZθ (Yθ)/dYθ ] or the disutility of earnings at the income level of the next lower type relative to   33 
the disutility of earnings at the own income level and let ϕθ denote dΦ(U)/dU evaluated at U= 
V(Cθ)- Zθ (Yθ). 
 
Because we restrict our attention to this class of perturbations that only affect the labor supply of 
types 1 and 2, we can simplify the analysis by aggregating types 3 through N into a single 
aggregate type.  This effectively turns the N-type problem into a 3-type problem: type 1 (denoted 
by the subscript L), type 2 (denoted by the subscript M) and a weighted average of types 3 
though N (denoted by the subscript H).  We first divide equation (A.6c) by vθ  and then sum this 
equation for θ =3 … N.  This yields: 
 




v        
   
µ       µ
= =
+   =     . 
 










H H    
 
       
=
=  , and 
3
N
H H v v    
 
   
=
=   .  Multiplying (A.7) by vH 
yields: 
 
(A.8)    αH µ0  + (αH ϕH  - µ2 ) vH  = 0 
 
In words, equation (A.8) effectively aggregates types 3 through N into a single type, the high 
type.  Renaming the type 1 type L, and renaming type 2 type M, we can rewrite the system of 
N+2 equations (A.6a-e) into a system of 5 equations: 
 
(A.9a)    αL µ0  + (αL ϕL  + µL) vL  = 0 
(A.9b)    αM µ0  + (αM ϕM  + µM + µL) vM  = 0 
(A.9c)    αH µ0  + (αH ϕH  - µM ) vH  = 0 
(A.9d)    -αL µ0  -  (αL ϕL  + µL rM) zLL = 0                   
(A.9e)   -αM µ0  -  (αM ϕM  - µL + µM rH) zMM  = 0                     
 
Before proceeding, we make two normalizations that will simplify the expressions that follow.  
First, we multiply the utility function U(C,Y) with a constant such that: 
 
(A.10)      αL vM vH +   αM vL vH +  αH vL vM  = 1                                       
 
Second, we multiply the social welfare function Φ(U) with a constant such that:  
 
(A.11)     αL ϕL  + αM ϕM  + αH ϕH = 1  
 
We solve the first-order conditions (A.9a-e) to find expressions for disutility of earnings (zLL and 
zMM) that must hold at the optimal single incentive schedule, {Ĉθ , Ŷθ}θ=1..N.  We find: 
 
(A.12)  
( ) ( ) ( ) 1
LL M H
L M H H L L H H M M L L M M H M
z v v
v v v v v v v v v r            
=
+   +    
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(A.13)  
( ) ( ) ( ) 1
MM M L H
M M L H L H L L H H M M H L L M M H H
z v v
v v v v v v v v v r
 
                 
=
+   +    
 
 
Note that both ratios are less than one, implying that the marginal disutility of earnings is less 
than the marginal utility of consumption.  In other words, at the optimum, the labor supply of the 
low and medium types is below the first-best level.  
 
We now define a set of perturbations {cθσ , yθσ}σ=G,B; θ=1..N  such that the menu of schedules is 
equal to the optimal single incentive schedule plus these perturbations:  
 
(A.14)    {Cθσ , Yθσ}={Ĉθ + cθσ, Ŷθ + yθσ } for σ=G,B and θ=1..N. 
 
Because of the assumption that the optimal single incentive schedule has a standard interior 
solution without bundling, there are no restrictions on the signs of the perturbations and, for 
sufficiently small perturbations, the perturbed solution is also interior and has no bundling.  We 
require that the perturbations satisfy the ex-ante and ex-post incentive constraints of the schedule 
selection problem: 
 
(A.15)   ( ) ' '
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
N




+   +   + + + =     for any σ, σ′, 
(A.16)   ( ) ( ) 1 1, 1 1, ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 V C c Z Y y V C c Z Y y                                   +   +   +   + =  for θ=2 .. N,  
 
and σ=B,G . In addition, we require that the deviations hold the expected utility of each type 
constant: 
 
(A.17)   ( ) ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
B G
B B G G V C c Z Y y V C c Z Y y V C Z Y
   
                         
   
   
   
+   + + +   + =     
 
for θ = 1 .. N.   Note that when the perturbations are all equal to zero, equations (A.15) and 
(A.17) hold trivially and equation (A.16) holds because it coincides with the incentive 
constraints of the single incentive schedule. We now linearize these constraints: 
 
(A.18)    ( ) ' '
1
( ) ( ) 0
N




      =   , 
(A.19)   1 1, 1, ( ) ( ) 0 v c z r y v c z y                                     + =      for θ=2 .. N;  σ = B,G,  and   
(A.20)   ( ) ( ) 0 B B B G G G v c z y v c z y                             +   =      for θ=1..N.  
 
We do not perturb the labor supply of types 3 though N, thus yθσ = 0  for σ=G,B and θ=3 .. N.  
We set cθσ = (v3/vθ) c3,σ for σ=G,B and θ = 3.. N.  Substituting cθσ = (v3/vθ) c3,σ and yθσ = 0 for 
σ=G,B and θ = 3.. N into equation (A.19) shows that this equation holds for θ = 4 ... N.  Making 
the same substitutions into equation (A.20) shows that this equation holds for θ = 4 .. N if and   35 





H H c c       
 
   
=
=  .  Using the definition 
3
N
H H v v    
 
   
=
=    and cθσ = (v3/vθ) c3,σ, it follows 
that: 
 
(A.21)   3 3 3 3
3 3
/ ( / ) / ( / )
N N
H H H H c c v v c v v c               
   
       
= =
= = =     .   
 
Using equation (A.21), renaming the type 1 type L, and renaming type 2 type M, we can rewrite 




( ) ( ) 0 G B G B G
L M H








( ) ( ) 0 B G B G B
L M H




      =    
(A.22) 
, , ( ) ( ) 0 L L MM M L M M MM M v c z r y v c z y             + =     for σ=B,G 
 
, , ( ) ( ) 0 M M HH H M H H HH H v c z r y v c z y             + =     for σ=B,G 
 
( ) ( ) 0 B B B G G G v c z y v c z y                             +   =      for θ=L,M,H.  
 
Since the permutation is 10-dimensional (cLB, cLG, cMB, cMG, cHB, cHG, yLB, yLG, yMB, yMG) and 
system of equations (A.22) consist of 9 constraints, the perturbation has one degree of freedom.  
Let this degree of freedom be taken up by the parameter ε.  The expressions for the perturbations 
can be simplified considerably by defining “contrasts” γij that measure how strongly the signal 
distinguishes between type i and type j: 
 
     
MG LG LB MB
ML
L M MB LB
       
 
       
   
=      
   
, 
(A.23)  
HG LG LB HB
HL
L H HB LB
       
 
       
   
=      
   
, and 
HG MG MB HB
HM
M H HB MB
       
 
       
   
=      
   
. 
 
We assume that the signals are informative and, in that case, these three contrasts are generically 
different from zero.  In the special case that they satisfy the monotone likelihood property (the 
probability of receiving a good signal is strictly increasing with type), αHG / αHB > αMG / αMB  > 
αLG / αLB and, as a result, the contrasts γij are strictly positive. Solving (A.22) and making use of 
the definitions (A.23), we find the following expressions for perturbations that satisfy the ex-ante 
and ex-post incentive constraints and that keep the expected utility of each type constant: 
   36 
(A.24a)  ( )( ) 1 / LB LG HM MG HL H LL y r z           = +    
(A.24b)  ( )( ) 1 / LG LB HM MB HL H LL y r z           =   +    
 
(A.24c)  ( )( ) 1 / MB HG ML MG HL M MM y r z           =   +    
(A.24d)  ( )( ) 1 / MG HB ML MB HL M MM y r z           = +    
 
(A.24e)  ( )( ) 1 / LB LG HM M MG HL H L c r r v           = +    
(A.24f)    ( )( ) 1 / LG LB HM M MB HL H L c r r v           =   +    
 
(A.24g)  ( )( ) 1 / MB HG ML MG HL H M M c r r v           =   +    
(A.24h)  ( )( ) 1 / MG HB ML MB HL H M M c r r v           = +    
 
(A.24i)   ( )( ) 1 1 / HB HG ML M H H c r r v       =        
(A.24j)   ( )( ) 1 1 / HG HB ML M H H c r r v       =      
 
Substituting these perturbations into the resources constraint and using equations (A.12) and 
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ML M H
M HL M L L M M H H L L H H M
L M H M L
L HM L L L H H M M M M H H L
r r
RC v v v v v v
v v v
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  =     +        
  +      
 
 
All terms in parentheses in (A.25) are positive, and the sign of this expression thus depends on 
the term in square brackets.  If we select a value of ε with the same sign as this expression, the 
resource constraint will be strictly relaxed, except for the combination of parameters where the 
term in square brackets is exactly zero.  Since the set of parameter combinations for which the 
term in square brackets is zero has Lebesgue measure zero, the resource constraint will be 
relaxed for generic distributions of α.  Moreover, since ε enters linearly, the efficiency gains are 
first order.  Since the change in the resource constraint depends on a first-order approximation of 
the effects of perturbing the optimal single incentive schedule, this expression only holds for 
small values of ε.  For larger values, second order effects could become important, and could 
generally offset the first-order gains.  The first-order gains from the relaxation of the resource 
constraint can be divided between the principle and each type of agent, thus achieving an 
interim-by-type Pareto improvement.   
The corollary follows immediately. The menu of schedules defined by the perturbation is 
inside the principal’s choice set and yields a strict first-order gain to the principal.  Hence, the 
menu of schedules selected by the principal must offer the principal a gain that is at least as 
large, and this gain must therefore also be strict and first-order.    37 
FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
 





Figure 3: The Cumulative Distribution of Pre-tax Earnings of Couples in the U.S.   38 
 





Figure 5: The Density Function of Ability Conditional on Signal 
   39 





Figure 7: Optimal Marginal Tax Rates as a Function of Earnings   40 
 
 





Figure 9: Effect of a Menu of Schedules on Social Welfare and Utility   41 
Table 1.  The Optimal Single Non-Linear Price Plan and the Optimal Menu of Non-Linear Price Plans 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  Low type  Medium type  High type       
  σ=B  σ=G  σ=B  σ=G  σ=B  σ=G  E[•| σ=B]  E[•| σ=G]  E[•] 
 
Panel A: Single non-linear price plan                   
1.   Quantity sold (X)    9.0  25.0  100.0  20.4    68.9  44.7 
2.   Revenue (P)  36.0  66.0  166.0  54.7  124.0  89.3 
3.   Producer Surplus (P-X)  27.0  41.0    66.0  34.3    55.1  44.7 
4.   Consumer Surplus (U)  0    9.0    34.0    5.3    23.4  14.3 
5.   Social Surplus  27.0  50.0  100.0  39.5    78.5  59.0 
                   
Panel B: Menu of non-linear price plans                 
1.   Quantity sold (X)  10.8  0.2  13.6  39.9  100.0  100.0  17.7    73.3  45.5 
2.   Revenue (P)  39.4  5.6  45.4  93.3  171.7  167.0  50.2  131.7  91.0 
3.   Producer Surplus (X-P)  28.6  5.4  31.9  53.4    71.7    67.0  32.6    58.4  45.5 
4.   Consumer Surplus (U) from own plan  0  0    9.8    1.4    28.3    33.0    5.2    20.2  12.7 
5.       Consumer Surplus from other plan                2.7    20.2   




Table 2. Distributional and Efficiency Effects of a Menu of Price Plans 
 
          Consumer Surplus is constrained 
to remain constant 
  U  Profit  DWL    U  Profit  DWL 
1. First-Best (type is observable)  0  23.9  0    14.3  9.6  0 
2. Non-Linear Pricing Conditional on Signal  8.7  10.3  4.9    14.3  8.2  1.4 
3. Menu of Non-Linear Price Plans  12.7  5.3  5.9    14.3  5.2  4.4 
4. Single Non-Linear Price Plan  14.3  4.5  5.1    14.3  4.5  5.1 
5. Single Linear Price Plan  (two-part tariff)  14.0  -6.2  16.0    14.3  -6.5  16.0 
 
Fixed costs are calibrated such that profit is equal to 5% of revenue in the case of the optimal single non-linear price plan.   42 
Table 3.  Menu of Schedules Versus Optimal Single Non-linear Schedule 
 
    Effects on Behavior    Tax Schedules    Welfare Effects    Distortions 






























Panel A: Menu of non-linear schedules vs. single non-linear schedule 
1.  Optimal menu of schedules  64,608  48,816  15,792      38.7%    34,953  10.314    3,423  21.7% 
      Average | bad signal  35,200  33,771  1,429    15,395  43.6%    26,944  10.150    2,809  196.6% 
      Average | good signal  100,044  66,944  33,100    10,235  32.7%    44,602  10.511    4,163  12.6% 
                           
2.  Optimal single nonlinear schedule  63,170  47,377  15,792    13,467  42.5%    34,492  10.290    3,863  24.5% 
      Average | bad signal  35,481  30,790  4,690    13,467  46.9%    23,826  10.011    2,517  53.7% 
      Average | good signal  96,533  67,363  29,170    13,467  37.2%    47,343  10.626    5,485  18.8% 
                           
  Percentage change   2.3%  3.0%  0.0%      -9.4%    1.3%  2.4%   -12.1%  -12.1% 
  Absolute change   $1,438  $1,438  $0      -3.8%    $461      -$440  -2.8% 
                           
Panel B: Menu of non-linear schedules vs. the single non-linear schedule that yields the same social welfare 
1.  Optimal menu of schedules  64,608  48,816  15,792      38.7%    34,953  10.314    3,423  21.7% 
3.  Optimal single nonlinear schedule  63,290  48,133  15,156    13,964  42.2%    35,176  10.314    3,815  25.2% 
  Change      $636            0.0%       
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Table 4. Alternative Tax Schedules 
 
    Effects on Behavior    Tax Schedules    Welfare Effects    Distortions 






























Panel A: Menu if signals are publicly observable 
4.  Optimal menu, observable signals  65,495  49,702  15,792      35.1%    35,306  10.335    3,048  19.3% 
2.  Optimal single nonlinear schedule  63,170  47,377  15,792    13,467  42.5%    34,492  10.290    3,863  24.5% 
  Change      $0            4.5%    -$815  -5.2% 
                           
Panel B: Menu that yields Pareto-by-signal improvement 
5.  Conditional  66,573  50,780  15,792      35.6%    35,676  10.309    2,690  17.0% 
      Average | bad signal  36,713  33,686  3,027    13,669  40.6%    25,993  10.097    2,150  71.0% 
      Average | good signal  102,551  71,377  31,174    10,225  29.6%    47,343  10.563    3,340  10.7% 
                           
2.  Optimal single nonlinear schedule  63,170  47,377  15,792    13,467  42.5%    34,492  10.290    3,863  24.5% 
      Average | bad signal  35,481  30,790  4,690    13,467  46.9%    23,826  10.011    2,517  53.7% 
      Average | good signal  96,533  67,363  29,170    13,467  37.2%    47,343  10.626    5,485  18.8% 
                           
  Change      $0            1.9%   -$2,145  -7.4% 
                           
Panel C: Non-linear vs. linear schedule 
2.  Optimal single nonlinear schedule  63,170  47,377  15,792    13,467  42.5%    34,492  10.290    3,863  24.5% 
6.  Optimal single linear schedule  61,892  46,100  15,792    10,811  42.1%    34,066  10.280    4,271  27.0% 
  Change       $0            1.0%    -$408  -2.6% 
 
Note: These calculations are based on a labor supply elasticity of 0.5 and the medium informative signal distribution. 
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Table 5: Sensitivity of the Welfare and Efficiency Gains to Parameter Assumptions 
 
Effect of a menu of tax schedules relative to 
the optimal single nonlinear tax schedule 
  Welfare gains    Reduction in DWL 
  Informativeness 
of signal 
Elasticity of 
labor supply           ($)  (percent) 
(percent of 
tax revenue)           ($)  (percent) 
(percent of 
tax revenue) 
                     
1.  Weak  0.2    $72  0.21%  0.49%    $59  1.73%  0.40% 
2.  Medium  0.2    $406  1.17%  2.75%    $318  9.64%  2.16% 
3.  Strong  0.2    $535  1.54%  3.63%    $424  13.07%  2.88% 
                     
4.  Weak  0.5    $123  0.47%  0.78%    $83  2.16%  0.52% 
5.  Medium  0.5    $636  2.39%  4.03%    $440  12.09%  2.79% 
6.  Strong  0.5    $833  3.11%  5.27%    $542  15.11%  3.43% 
                     
7.  Weak  1.0    $173  0.91%  0.92%    $104  2.44%  0.55% 
8.  Medium  1.0    $844  4.35%  4.47%    $568  14.07%  3.01% 
9.  Strong  1.0    $1,066  5.46%  5.64%    $460  11.26%  2.44% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 